

Room: 209 Davis College
Dates: 01/09/23 - 04/24/23
Time: T & Th 11:40 AM-12:55 PM

Professor: Matthew Wilson

Email: wilso929@mailbox.sc.edu
Office: 337 Gambrell Hall
Office Hours: T 1-2 PM & by appointment



Mao Tse-tung,
(P. R.) China 1945-1976



Augusto Pinochet,
Chile 1973-1990

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

What explains the rise and fall of dictators? What, if anything can be learned from the ways they govern? Using theoretical approaches, case studies, and quantitative research, this course examines the politics of authoritarian rule by focusing on dictators and their demise. The goals of the class are to provide empirical accounts of a variety of dictatorships, differentiate among their governing strategies, and discern the long-term impacts of dictatorship on institutional and economic development. The course primarily focuses on broad differences in ruling styles and their relations to the survival of dictators and their regimes. The course also examines the impacts of dictatorship on human rights, economic growth, conflict, and political institutions.

EXPECTED LEARNING OUTCOMES:

As a result of the class, students will be able to:

- Identify the major arguments in published research on dictatorships and democratization
- Critically evaluate the effects of institutions and strategies on the survival of dictatorship
- Distinguish between the ruling styles and consequences of modern dictators

COURSE REQUIREMENTS: Students are expected to

- (1) read assigned materials **before** the start of each class;
- (2) attend all lectures and participate in in-class exercises;
- (3) complete two in-class exams;

Exams will be a combination of multiple choice, fill-in-the-blank, and essay questions.

- (4) complete two research assignments;

Assignment 1:

Each student will be expected to research the political biographies of two dictators (background, how they obtained office, notable actions, and how they left office) and describe their impacts on politics in their country. The student's grade will be determined by the quality of research, the student's writing ability, and the extent to which they answer prompt questions. (More information will be provided separately.)

Assignment 2:

Each student will be responsible for researching two cases of democratization and describing them in detail (major events, actors, and attributes). The student's grade will be determined by the quality of research, the student's writing ability, and the extent to which they answer prompt questions. (More information will be provided separately.)

GRADES:

Two in-class exams @ 20% (40%); Two research assignments @ 25% (50%);

Participation (10%) (*determined by pop-quizzes and responses to in-class responses*)

A: 90-100; B+: 87-89.9; B: 80-86.9; C+: 77-79.9; C: 70-76.9; D+: 67-69.9; D: 60 to 66.9; F: 0-59.9

READING MATERIALS:

Students are **not** expected to purchase any books for the class. All required readings will be made available online or through the University of South Carolina library.

CLASS POLICIES:

Failure to follow class rules will affect the student's participation grade.

1. The use of cell phones is not permitted and computers are allowed to take notes only.
2. Please do not read outside materials.
3. Sleeping in class is not allowed.
4. Grades will not be changed if an issue is reported after two weeks have passed.
5. Late assignments will not be accepted without advance notice and excusal.

FINE PRINT:

Academic integrity. I follow rigorous standards of academic integrity in all aspects of the course. The University of South Carolina provides detailed definitions of acts considered to fall under academic dishonesty and possible ensuing sanctions in the University Honor Code: <http://www.sc.edu/policies/ppm/staf625.pdf>. Should you have any questions about possibly improper research citations or references, or any activity that may be interpreted as academic dishonesty, please see me before the assignment is due to discuss the matter.

Personal integrity. I am committed to creating and fostering a positive learning and working environment based on open communication, mutual respect, and inclusion. I will not tolerate discrimination and harassment on the basis of identity or status, including race, color, national origin, religion, sex, gender, age, disability, sexual orientation, genetics, or veteran status. For more information on the University Student Non-Discrimination and Non-Harassment Policy, see https://www.sc.edu/about/offices_and_divisions/equal_opportunities_programs/documents/student_non-discrimination_and_non-harassment_policy.pdf. If you want to speak to someone about an incident involving harassment, sexual assault, or interpersonal violence, you can call 803-777-8248 to talk to a trained interpersonal violence advocate.

Accommodations. If you are a person with a disability and anticipate needing any type of accommodation in order to participate in this class, please advise me and make appropriate arrangements with the Student Disability Resource Center. All disability accommodations must be approved through the Office of Student Disability Services. For more information, see https://sc.edu/about/offices_and_divisions/student_disability_resource_center/. Special accommodations are also available for veterans on duty and for parents.

Adverse weather commitment. In the event of inclement or threatening weather, please use your best judgment regarding travel to and from campus. If you cannot get to class because of adverse weather conditions, you should contact me as soon as possible. I will make allowances relative to required attendance policies and class activities. I will also notify you of any cancellation or change as soon as possible to prevent you from embarking on any unnecessary travel. For weather-related news and announcements, see <https://sc.edu/uofsc/weather/>.

Students are responsible for knowing both university and course schedules.

The academic calendar is available at: https://sc.edu/about/offices_and_divisions/registrar/academic_calendars/2022-23_calendar.php.

CLASS SCHEDULE:[†]

01/10 *Introduction & Video 1*

Gandhi, J. (2008). *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.[‡]

Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

01/12

North, D. C. (1981). *Structure and Change in Economic History*. Norton, New York.[‡]

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. (2004). Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 18481.

01/17

Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. *American Political Science Review*, 87(3):567–576.

Wintrobe, R. (1998). *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.[‡]

01/19

Moore, B. (1966). *Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Beacon Press, Boston.[‡]

Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.[‡]

01/24

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, New York.[‡]

Albertus, M. and Menaldo, V. (2018). *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.[‡]

Rules of Dictatorship

01/26

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., and Morrow, J. D. (2005). *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press, (paperback) edition.[‡]

01/31

Wiarda, H. J. and Kryzaneck, M. J. (1992). Trujillo and the caudillo tradition. In (Ed.), H. M. H., editor, *Caudillos: Dictators in Spanish America*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Magaloni, B. (2008). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.[‡]

02/02

Wintrobe, R. (1998). *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.[‡]

Ross, M. (2001). Does oil hinder democracy? *World Politics*, 53:325–361.

Political Institutions

02/07

Svolik, M. (2012). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.[‡]

Brancati, D. (2014). Democratic authoritarianism: Origins and effects. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17.

02/09

Gandhi, J., Noble, B., and Svobik, M. (2020). Legislatures and legislative politics without democracy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(9):1359–1379.

Moustafa, T. (2014). Law and courts in authoritarian regimes. *American Review of Law and Social Science*, 10:281–299.

02/14

Knutsen, C. H., Nygård, H. M., and Wig, T. (2017). Autocratic elections: Stabilizing tool or force for change? *World Politics*, 69(1):98–143.

Magaloni, B. and Kricheli, R. (2010). Political order and one-party rule. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13:123–143.

02/16

Geddes, B. (2003). *Sandcastles and Paradigms: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.‡

Wilson, M. C. (2014). A discreet critique of discrete regime type data. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(5):689–714.

02/21 *Thought experiment I: Conceptualizing Dictatorship*

Adcock, R. and Collier, D. (2001). Measurement validity: A shared standard for qualitative and quantitative research. *American political science review*, 95(3):529–546.

02/23

Chin, J., Escribá-Folch, A., Song, W., and Wright, J. (2022). Reshaping the threat environment: Personalism, coups, and assassinations. *Comparative Political Studies*, 55(4):657–687.

Leber, A., Carothers, C., and Reichert, M. (2022). When can dictators go it alone? personalization and oversight in authoritarian regimes. *Politics & Society*, pages 1–42.

02/28 *Recap*03/02 *Midterm exam*

03/07 [Spring break; no class]

03/09 [Spring break; no class]

Outcomes

03/14

Weeks, J. L. (2008). Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. *International Organization*, 62((Winter)):35–64.

Wilson, M. and Piazza, J. (2013). Autocracies and terrorism: Conditioning effects of authoritarian regime-type on terrorist attacks. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4):941–955.

03/16

Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., and Berge, J. (2022). Does democracy matter? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 25:357–375.

Glaeser, E. L., Porta, R. L., de Silanes, F. L., and Shleifer, A. (2004). Do institutions cause growth? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9:271–303.

03/21

Miller, M. K. (2015). Electoral authoritarianism and human development. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(12):1526–1562.

Knutsen, C. H. and Rasmussen, M. (2018). The autocratic welfare state: Old-age pensions, credible commitments, and regime survival. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(5):659–695.

03/23

Escribá-Folch, A. (2013). Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy. *International Political Science Review*, 34(5):543–560.

Guriev, S. and Treisman, D. (2020). The popularity of authoritarian leaders: A cross-national investigation. *World Politics*, 72(4):601–638.

03/28

Xu, X. (2020). To repress or to co-opt? authoritarian control in the age of digital surveillance. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Rød, E. G. and Weidmann, N. B. (2015). Empowering activists or autocrats? the internet in authoritarian regimes. *Journal of Peace Research*, 52(3):338–351.

Democracy, Democratization, and Democratic Survival

03/30

Riedl, R. B., Slater, D., Wong, J., and Ziblatt, D. (2020). Authoritarian-led democratization. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 23:1–18.

Treisman, D. (2020). Democracy by mistake: How the errors of autocrats trigger transitions to freer government. *American Political Science Review*, 114:792–810.

04/04 *Thought experiment II: Conceptualizing Democracy and Democratization*

Collier, D. and Adcock, R. (1999). Democracy and dichotomies: A pragmatic approach to choices about concepts. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2:537–565.

04/06

Boese, V. A. (2019). How (not) to measure democracy. *International Area Studies Review*, 22(2):95–127.

Munck, G. L. and Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: Evaluating alternative indices. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(1):5–34.

04/11

Reenock, C., Staton, J. K., and Radean, M. (2013). Legal institutions and democratic survival. *Journal of Politics*, 75(2):491–505.

Schedler, A. (1998). What is democratic consolidation? *Journal of Democracy*, 9(2):91–107.

04/13 *Video + questions/summaries*

04/18 *Thought experiment III: Conceptualizing Democratic Backsliding and Breakdown*

04/20

Brownlee, J. and Miao, K. (2022). Why democracies survive. *Journal of Democracy*, 33(4):133–149.

Matovski, A. (2021). *Popular Dictatorships: Crises, Mass Opinion, and the Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

TBD *Final exam*

† Many of these readings contain statistical analyses and equations that may be difficult to comprehend. Students are **not** expected to review the portions with statistics/analyses/equations, nor will they be tested on them. Students are *only* expected to understand broad concepts and questions raised in the assigned material.

‡ Refers to selected portions that will be made available online.

References

- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. (2004). Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 18481.
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Adcock, R. and Collier, D. (2001). Measurement validity: A shared standard for qualitative and quantitative research. *American political science review*, 95(3):529–546.
- Albertus, M. and Menaldo, V. (2018). *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Boese, V. A. (2019). How (not) to measure democracy. *International Area Studies Review*, 22(2):95–127.
- Brancati, D. (2014). Democratic authoritarianism: Origins and effects. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17.
- Brownlee, J. and Miao, K. (2022). Why democracies survive. *Journal of Democracy*, 33(4):133–149.
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- Chin, J., Escribá-Folch, A., Song, W., and Wright, J. (2022). Reshaping the threat environment: Personalism, coups, and assassinations. *Comparative Political Studies*, 55(4):657–687.
- Collier, D. and Adcock, R. (1999). Democracy and dichotomies: A pragmatic approach to choices about concepts. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2:537–565.
- Escribá-Folch, A. (2013). Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy. *International Political Science Review*, 34(5):543–560.
- Gandhi, J. (2008). *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gandhi, J., Noble, B., and Svobik, M. (2020). Legislatures and legislative politics without democracy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(9):1359–1379.
- Geddes, B. (2003). *Sandcastles and Paradigms: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., and Berge, J. (2022). Does democracy matter? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 25:357–375.
- Glaeser, E. L., Porta, R. L., de Silanes, F. L., and Shleifer, A. (2004). Do institutions cause growth? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9:271–303.
- Guriev, S. and Treisman, D. (2020). The popularity of authoritarian leaders: A cross-national investigation. *World Politics*, 72(4):601–638.
- Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Knutsen, C. H., Nygård, H. M., and Wig, T. (2017). Autocratic elections: Stabilizing tool or force for change? *World Politics*, 69(1):98–143.
- Knutsen, C. H. and Rasmussen, M. (2018). The autocratic welfare state: Old-age pensions, credible commitments, and regime survival. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(5):659–695.
- Leber, A., Carothers, C., and Reichert, M. (2022). When can dictators go it alone? personalization and oversight in authoritarian regimes. *Politics & Society*, pages 1–42.

- Magaloni, B. (2008). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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- Matovski, A. (2021). *Popular Dictatorships: Crises, Mass Opinion, and the Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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- Moustafa, T. (2014). Law and courts in authoritarian regimes. *American Review of Law and Social Science*, 10:281–299.
- Munck, G. L. and Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: Evaluating alternative indices. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(1):5–34.
- North, D. C. (1981). *Structure and Change in Economic History*. Norton, New York.
- Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. *American Political Science Review*, 87(3):567–576.
- Reenock, C., Staton, J. K., and Radean, M. (2013). Legal institutions and democratic survival. *Journal of Politics*, 75(2):491–505.
- Riedl, R. B., Slater, D., Wong, J., and Ziblatt, D. (2020). Authoritarian-led democratization. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 23:1–18.
- Ross, M. (2001). Does oil hinder democracy? *World Politics*, 53:325–361.
- Rød, E. G. and Weidmann, N. B. (2015). Empowering activists or autocrats? the internet in authoritarian regimes. *Journal of Peace Research*, 52(3):338–351.
- Schedler, A. (1998). What is democratic consolidation? *Journal of Democracy*, 9(2):91–107.
- Svolik, M. (2012). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Treisman, D. (2020). Democracy by mistake: How the errors of autocrats trigger transitions to freer government. *American Political Science Review*, 114:792–810.
- Weeks, J. L. (2008). Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. *International Organization*, 62((Winter)):35–64.
- Wiarda, H. J. and Kryzaneck, M. J. (1992). Trujillo and the caudillo tradition. In (Ed.), H. M. H., editor, *Caudillos: Dictators in Spanish America*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Wilson, M. and Piazza, J. (2013). Autocracies and terrorism: Conditioning effects of authoritarian regime-type on terrorist attacks. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4):941–955.
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- Xu, X. (2020). To repress or to co-opt? authoritarian control in the age of digital surveillance. *American Journal of Political Science*.