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RESEARCH NOTE

## Militarism and Dual-Conflict Capacity

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### ABSTRACT

This research note examines how domestic institutions can moderate the relationship between domestic and interstate conflict involvement. Previous work has found that military dictatorships are more likely to become involved in either domestic or international conflicts, compared to party-based autocracies. We argue that the same institutional explanations for why military autocracies are more conflict-prone also make them less capable of successfully carrying out multiple conflicts at the same time. Analyzing interstate and domestic conflict involvement on a sample of dictatorships over the period 1947–2004, we show that military autocracies dealing with internal armed conflict are less likely than their nonmilitary counterparts to become involved in an international conflict.

### KEYWORDS

Autocracy; domestic conflict; dual conflict; interstate conflict; military regime

## Introduction

The military junta led by General Augusto Pinochet in Chile between the years 1973 and 1990 was characterized by forced disappearances, political imprisonment, and armed confrontations with political rivals. However, Chile was not involved in any armed interstate conflict during the period overseen by Pinochet. This was true despite the conflictual relations that Chile had with neighboring Argentina (Gertner 2014). Chile and Argentina came close to war during a 1978 border dispute over islands in a channel in Tierra del Fuego that connected the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Yet, before the conflict escalated to war, both states allowed the Vatican to mediate and reached an agreement without fighting (Parish 2006; Garrett 1985; Thies 2001). For Chile, which Thies (2001) argues behaved in a more conciliatory fashion than Argentina, the decision was driven not only by its international isolation and lack of allies but also by the fact that the human rights violations by the Pinochet regime had led to internal conflict in the regime. Parish (2006) argues that in the case of the Chilean and Argentinean rivalry, the political weakness of leaders at the domestic level made cooperation more likely at the international level. Some accounts argue that this internal

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vulnerability led Chile to behave in a less hawkish fashion toward Argentina and agree to a mediated settlement (Gertner 2014; Thies 2001).

This illustrative example supports asking how the relationship between domestic conflict and interstate conflict is moderated by domestic institutions in the autocratic context. Much work has been devoted to uncovering the relationship of domestic political institutions to interstate war and to civil conflict (James and Oneal 1991, Kinne and Marinov 2011; Lai and Slater 2006; Lektzian and Souva 2009; Oren and Hays 1997; Peceny, Beer, and Sánchez-Terry 2002; Pickering and Kisangani 2010; Weart 1994; Weeks 2008). Scholars have demonstrated that some regime types are more prone to interstate disputes and domestic armed conflicts. For example, compared to party-based autocracies, military regimes are more likely to be involved in domestic conflicts (Fjelde 2010; Gurses and Mason 2010), as well as in international conflicts (Lai and Slater 2006; Lektzian and Souva 2009; Peceny et al. 2002; Weeks 2008). However, there is little theoretical discussion about the relatedness of these two relationships. We argue that institutional features of military autocracies make military regimes less capable of successfully managing multiple conflicts at the same time. Military regimes lack the legitimacy created by elections or parties and thus rely on coercion for governing. This means that the same instrument used to govern domestically—the state’s security forces—is the one also used to engage in international conflict. It should thus be more difficult for military regimes to handle both a domestic crisis and an international conflict at the same time. In the presence of a domestic conflict, therefore, military regimes should be significantly less likely to become involved in an international conflict. Based on an analysis of conflict propensity among autocratic regimes over the period 1947–2004, we demonstrate that interstate conflict involvement is conditional on both regime type and domestic stability.

While studies have already demonstrated that military regimes are more likely to be involved in both domestic and interstate conflicts than other regime types, anticipating conflict involvement depends on additional factors—including competing risks. This study thus contributes to the outstanding literature by synthesizing theories on the determinants of interstate and intrastate conflict. It focuses on their relationship to each other under specific institutions, encouraging scholars to think about the simultaneity of the internal and external threats that regimes face. The article also speaks to the foreign policy substitutability literature by addressing the dependent relationship between internal and external conflict involvement. Though it focuses on a relatively small number of cases, it applies the conclusions from previous research to make an assertion about the observation of conflict, thereby testing the validity of existing theories about the consequences of institutions.

## Military autocracies and conflict involvement

Domestic institutions are frequently cited as a primary determinant of conflict engagement (James and Oneal 1991; Kinne and Marinov 2011; Lai and Slater 2006; Lektzian and Souva 2009; Oren and Hays 1997; Peceny et al. 2002; Pickering and Kisangani 2010; Weart 1994; Weeks 2008). For example, winning coalition size, the methods of replacement, and bureaucratic capacity have all been used to explain democracies' decreased propensity to become engaged in either internal or external conflict. At the same time, similar attributes have also been used to explain differences in the conflict propensities of nondemocracies. Scholars note that there is considerable institutional variation among modern autocracies, differentiating them based on the size of support coalitions, rules for succession, and means of coercing or co-opting opposition (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014; Gleditsch and Ward 1997). Autocratic institutions are thus also cited as factors that may influence leaders' responsiveness to international pressure, the credibility of signals, the decision and timing of conflict engagement, and the willingness to peacefully negotiate the end of a dispute (Escribá-Folch and Wright 2010; Kinne and Marinov 2011; Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 2008).

When considering the different conflict behaviors of autocracies, it is therefore important to first think about their institutional differences. A common distinction in the literature on autocratic regimes is between regimes that are governed through the use of a political party, as opposed to those in which the government is headed by the armed forces (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014; Hadenius and Teorell 2007)<sup>1</sup>. Relative to other forms of authoritarianism, military governments exhibit some unique institutional characteristics that dispose them to conflict. Whereas other regimes derive political legitimacy from parties and elections, material co-optation, or divine right, the legitimacy of the military stems from its role as the protector of national defense. As a result, governing officers tend to see political discord within the ranks of the military as a threat to domestic security and by extension to their legitimacy as a government. Further, the military has a comparative advantage over the use of force, making physical control its primary tool for handling disputes (Davenport 2007; Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014; Nordlinger 1977; Wintrobe 1998). Thus, the lack of institutional constraints and the strength of the armed forces help to explain why military dictatorships should be more likely than others to become engaged in international conflicts.

In contrast to military regimes, leaders in party-based autocracies are able to derive credibility from authoritarian parties and elections, which

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<sup>1</sup>Monarchical and personalist regimes govern largely without the use of either institution and are thus characterized by a narrow ruling coalition (Geddes 2003; Wright 2008).

institutionalize mechanisms for elites to mobilize to punish the leader in the event that s/he backs down. These constraints should make leaders more selective of international conflict engagement (Kinne and Marinov 2011; Weeks 2008). In contrast, military and personalist dictatorships—which lack the constraints provided by regular mechanisms for replacement—should be more likely than party-based dictatorships to become involved in international conflict.<sup>2</sup> Military and party-based authoritarian regimes also retain stronger and more cohesive militaries, thereby making them more likely than personalist regimes to engage in international conflict. The lack of institutional constraints, combined with the strength and cohesiveness of the military as an institution, helps to explain why scholars have found military dictatorships to be more likely than party-based and personalist regimes to become involved in international conflicts.<sup>3</sup>

Scholars have also demonstrated that military regimes are more likely to become involved in domestic conflicts (Fjelde 2010; Gurses and Mason 2010). This can be attributed to their failure to co-opt citizens and their nearly exclusive reliance on force to resolve domestic problems (Wilson and Piazza 2013). On average, military dictatorships lack the natural resource wealth possessed by personalist and monarchical regimes to “buy-off” citizen dissatisfaction (Ross 2001; Wright 2008). They also frequently eschew the political channels provided by political parties and elections that other dictatorships use to promote loyal opposition and direct mass activism (Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2008). Moreover, military regimes are often much less connected to society; as Fjelde (2010:200) has pointed out, “[m]ilitary regimes ... lack the broad societal front that could allow them to mobilize the population as a source of support for the regime”. Insofar as militarized authoritarian regimes are vulnerable to domestic unrest, they should be more likely to have it escalate into armed violence.

Previous work has therefore identified military dictatorships as being especially disposed to both domestic and international conflict than other forms of authoritarianism. This nevertheless raises the question of whether they are negatively affected by the joint risks posed by each type of conflict. The substitutability of physical force as a conflict response should depend, in part, on the extent to which the armed forces are previously engaged (Davies 2016; Enterline and Gleditsch 2000; Oakes 2012). According to the foreign policy substitutability literature, the use of a particular policy tool is a function of its efficiency, which is compromised by the need to employ it at multiple fronts (Morgan and Palmer

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<sup>2</sup>At the same time, the size, strength, and autonomy of the armed forces is undermined by efforts to “coup-proof” the regime in personalist and “strongman” regimes, potentially making them less militarily effective against foreign foes (Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014; Peceny et al. 2002; Svobik 2009; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Powell 2012; Weeks 2012).

<sup>3</sup>Mixed, personalist, and military dyads are more conflict-prone, (Lai and Slater 2006; Lektzian and Souva 2009; Peceny 2002), and military regimes are more likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) (Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 2008).

2000; Palmer and Morgan 2011). To the extent that the instrument for managing conflicts is also responsible for the charge of governing the nation, this should present a problem for responding to simultaneous conflicts. The military's role in national defense and its concentrated administrative capacity should make it particularly vulnerable to the pressure to govern and engage in international war at the same time. As a result, civil unrest can complicate its ability to effectively initiate or reciprocate international challenges.<sup>4</sup> This argument can be expressed as the following hypothesis:

*H1: Military autocracies are less likely to be involved in international conflicts, given domestic conflict, than nonmilitary autocracies*

Our specific focus on military dictatorships' propensity for international conflict given domestic conflict (and not domestic conflict given international conflict) stems from the expectation that domestic conflict is more endogenous to military dictatorships than is international conflict. Military regimes have commonly been borne out of states of emergency imposed during domestic unrest, and we expect that such governments have less discretion over choosing to engage with domestic actors Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014); Nordlinger (1977). We also expect internal conflict to be more of a determinant of international conflict engagement than the reverse—while citizens may be more likely to tolerate military rule given an eminent threat, we do not expect that to be responsible for the cessation of ongoing domestic conflict. The argument that supports Hypothesis 1 suggests that military regimes should elect to not enter into multiple conflicts. It further suggests that military regimes facing domestic turmoil that are targeted by international foes may be more likely to acquiesce to the international opponent's demands rather than engage in dual conflict.<sup>5</sup> Either one of these mechanisms leads us to expect a lower frequency of multilevel conflicts fought by military regimes than their civilian counterparts. Although military regimes are more likely to fight domestic conflicts and international conflicts in general, they should be less capable of fighting and surviving both types of conflict at the same time. Thus, military autocracies should be less likely to become involved in an international conflict in the presence of domestic conflict.

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<sup>4</sup>Another institutional feature of military dictatorships that guides their ability to effectively handle multiple threats is the priority placed by a military organization on hierarchy and discipline, which makes it relatively inflexible to internal divisions (Geddes 2003; Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014; Nordlinger 1977). In fact, when faced with factional differences, the military will often negotiate its way out of power instead of using force against its opponents, given that the military can place more emphasis on its own unity than on remaining in power (Geddes 2003; Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014). As a result of its relative rigidity, it should be more difficult for the military as an organization to split attention between simultaneous threats (Starr 1994). Military dictatorships should therefore be more sensitive than party-based or personalist regimes to the trade-offs between revolution and war, making them less likely to engage in dual conflicts.

<sup>5</sup>In an initial analysis, we found that military regimes involved in domestic conflict are both less likely to initiate and be the targets of international disputes. In the Discussion section we expand on how future research can more fully address this question.

## Research design

This study concerns conflict involvement both at the domestic and international level. To operationalize these outcomes, we use the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD), which includes data on both conflict types. The UCDP/PRIO ACD defines conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Hårbom, Strand, and Nygard 2009). Specifically, we rely on the UCDP/PRIO category of *interstate armed conflicts* to capture international conflict, and *internal armed conflicts* to measure domestic conflict (Gleditsch, Petter, Wallensteen, Eroksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom et al. 2009; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).<sup>6</sup> For each, we collapsed the levels of intensity (minor, intermediate, and major) into a binary measure of whether conflict occurred, as we have no prior expectation regarding conflict intensity.

Our primary interest in conflict involvement concerns its relative likelihood in different forms of authoritarian regimes. Based on the expectations that democratic leaders are unable to avoid punishment if they back down from an international threat and that dictators have greater control over conflict decisions (see Fearon 1994), we focused exclusively on nondemocratic regimes. Primarily, we compare military-based autocracies to nonmilitary autocracies, which includes party-based, personalist, and monarchical regimes. We find Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), who code military regimes as governments run by a group of military officers, a better indicator of the armed forces’ involvement in government affairs than other conceptualizations that define military regimes based on whether the head was ever in the military (Cheibub et al. 2010) or utilized armed force (Hadenius and Teorell 2007).<sup>7</sup> *Military regimes* refer to nondemocratic regimes in which “control over policy, leadership selection, and the security apparatus is in the hands of [...] the military” (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014:318). In total, the dictatorships coded by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) represent 279 regime spells that occurred across 118 countries between 1946 and 2010.

Among the 3,667 country-year observations coded by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) as civilian regimes, roughly 7% became involved in an internal armed conflict at any level of severity, and 4% involved an international armed conflict. In contrast, nearly 17% and 6% of the 558 observations coded as military dictatorships saw internal and international armed conflicts, respectively. At the same time, however, roughly the same percent of each (1.1 and 1.3) experienced both internal and international armed conflict at the same

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<sup>6</sup>In focusing exclusively on *interstate* and *internal* armed conflicts, our analysis omits extrasystemic and internationalized internal armed conflicts.


<sup>7</sup>For a discussion of alternative data sets on authoritarian regime type, see Wilson (2014).



time. As [Figure 1](#) illustrates, military regimes appear more likely than civilian dictatorships to become involved in an internal or external conflict but not more likely to become involved in both forms of conflict at the same time. Notably, 28 of the 3,667 observations pertaining to nonmilitary dictatorships involved international conflict of intermediate or major severity while also experiencing internal armed conflict, of which there was only 1 country-year observation involving a military dictatorship.

We controlled for several domestic factors that should affect conflict risk. First, we included logged values of the population and per capita Gross Domestic Product, which were estimated by [Gleditsch \(2002\)](#). We also used the measure of ethnic fractionalization created by [Fearon \(2003\)](#), which reflects the probability that two randomly selected individuals would belong to different ethnic groups. The value ranges from zero, which indicates a perfectly homogenous population, to one (completely heterogeneous). To account for potential differences across geographic regions, we denoted major regions of the world with a set of dummy variables. Additionally, given the very real possibility of autocorrelation in the standard errors, we compared estimates using country-, year-, and regime-clustered standard errors. We also estimated the same models with fixed and random effects. To account for the possibility that conflict in a given year is determined by whether there has been conflict in the past, we included a one-year lag of the dependent variable, as well as a count of the number of peace years that a state has experienced up to the year of the observation.

We tested the hypothesis by estimating logistic regressions predicting whether or not interstate armed conflict occurred, conditional on the



**Figure 1.** Conflicts by regime type.



presence of internal armed conflict. This involved including an interaction term between military dictatorships and a dummy variable indicating internal armed conflict in a given country-year. Endogeneity is a major concern, however, as the military in various countries historically presided over turbulent domestic conditions. Our solution was to lag all of the time-varying independent variables by one year and to compare models without the one-year lag, and with a control for the duration of the regime, in robustness specifications. Summary statistics are provided in the Online Appendix (Table A1).

## Results

Logistic regressions comparing military and nonmilitary dictatorships based on their propensity for domestic and international conflict confirm that military autocracies are indeed more belligerent, a finding that is robust to a number of different model specifications (see Figures A1 and A2 in the Online Appendix). Specified and interpreted independently, therefore, a reasonable conclusion would be that military dictatorships are always more likely to become involved in conflict compared to nonmilitary regimes. When the two types of conflict are jointly considered, however, military dictatorships become considerably less likely to be involved in external conflict. [Table 1](#) shows the results of a model that also accounts for whether there was an ongoing domestic conflict in a given year, as well as its interaction with the dummy variable for military regimes. The results are interpreted as odds ratios, for which values less than one indicate a lower probability and values above one a higher probability of the outcome occurring.

Based on [Table 1](#), a nonmilitary autocracy is highly unlikely to be involved in international armed conflict, the odds of which are roughly 0.043 to 1. Perhaps unsurprisingly, countries fighting an external conflict in the previous year are much more likely to continue fighting it in the next, while each additional year of peace is associated with a slight decrease in the probability of observing an external conflict. What is more, the odds of becoming involved in an external conflict while undergoing internal armed conflict are roughly twice that of countries that were not experiencing domestic conflict in the previous year. Compared to nonmilitary autocracies, military dictatorships are roughly 2.7 times more likely to be involved in an external armed conflict. At the same time, military regimes that experienced an internal armed conflict in the previous year were roughly 83% less likely to fight an external conflict. All of the estimates are significant below a 1% probability of error.


[Figure 2](#) shows the impact on the model shown in [Table 1](#) when we try a number of alternative specifications, including accounting for demographic,

**Table 1.** Logistic Regression Predicting External Conflict.

Variable	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.
Military Regime $t_{-1}$	2.72	(0.63)***
Internal Conflict $t_{-1}$	1.98	(0.46)***
Military Regime x Internal Conflict $t_{-1}$	0.17	(0.11)***
External Conflict $t_{-1}$	32.52	(5.98)***
External Peace Years $t_{-1}$	0.94	(0.01)***
Intercept	0.04	(0.01)***
<i>N</i>		4,161
log-likelihood		-564

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.10$ .



**Figure 2.** Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. (Models include the lagged dependent variable and a count of peace years).

economic, and geographic controls, clustering the standard errors, and including fixed and random effects. In almost all of the specifications, military regimes are significantly less likely than nonmilitary autocracies to become involved in external conflict, conditional on an ongoing internal armed conflict.<sup>8</sup> The same result holds regardless of whether we measure internal conflict as a dummy variable or control for the level of intensity (minor, intermediate, or major). Despite the potential for small-sample bias resulting from relatively few conflict events (see, for example, King and Zeng 2001), we find similar results when we use a penalized-likelihood solution to

<sup>8</sup>We note that the coefficient loses statistical significance in the model in which we include all controls and fixed effects. Given the suggestion by Gelman (2005:21) to treat “all batches of effects as sets of random variables”, we find the model that includes random effects to be the more appropriate one.

deal with bias associated with small samples in maximum likelihood estimation (Firth 1993). We also find similar results if we substitute another indicator of military dictatorship (Cheibub, et al. 2010), though the confidence intervals around the estimates are somewhat larger.<sup>9</sup> This is unsurprising, considering that Cheibub et al. (2010) code as military dictatorships any regime in which the executive is or was part of the military. We do not find similar results when we compare personalist regimes,<sup>10</sup> nor when we exchange internal conflict with coup attempts.<sup>11</sup> We expect that this is because countries in which the military is more professionalized and committed to governing as an organization are more constrained in managing dual conflicts.

The results therefore support our theoretical expectations. Compared to other forms of autocracy, military regimes are less likely to be involved in external conflicts, given an internal conflict. The decreased propensity of military dictatorships to fight external conflicts when there is an ongoing domestic conflict is highly robust to alternative specifications. The results also hold when we control for the age of the regime, thereby accounting for the short-lived nature of military spells. At the same time, however, military regimes are not less likely to be involved in internal conflicts given external conflict, as shown by Table A3 in the Online Appendix.

## Discussion

Our results show support for previous work that has found that military autocracies are more likely to be involved in both internal and external conflict compared to other autocratic governments. Given this finding, it is perhaps surprising to find that military regimes that are also experiencing domestic conflict are less likely to become involved in international conflict. We argue that the reason for this has to do with the limited abilities of military regimes to use force on two different levels. While military regimes are more belligerent overall, the fact that they use the same institutions to govern as they do to carry out conflict does not allow them to mobilize resources to fight simultaneous conflicts as easily as party-based regimes (which derive their legitimacy not only from coercion but also from institutions such as political parties and elections). One possibility could be that military regimes affected by internal conflict destabilize prior to entering into international conflict, opting instead to return to the barracks (Geddes 2003). Whether or not they expect to remain in office, however, military

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<sup>9</sup>The results of this analysis are included in the Online Appendix as Table A2.

<sup>10</sup>Included as Table A4 in the Online Appendix.

<sup>11</sup>We do, however, obtain similar results when we add attempted and successful coups as control variables, which we present as Table A5 in the Online Appendix.

dictatorships under pressure of internal conflict appear less likely to select into international conflicts.

Our findings speak only to the conflict involvement of military regimes and not to the actual process through which they avoid becoming involved in dual conflicts. Something to consider in particular is the dynamic through which military regimes avoid dual conflict. While our theoretical setup leads us to believe that military regimes would be less likely to initiate interstate conflicts when facing domestic turmoil, we must also consider the fact that a state in which the leader finds his or herself threatened by an internal challenger can be an appealing target. This would be particularly true in the context of rivalries, as leaders in rival states will consider how domestic conditions in a potential target state will affect that state's ability to respond to a challenge (Huth and Russett 1993). One potential explanation, however, is that military regimes experiencing internal conflict know that they are more vulnerable to outside threats and so may behave in a less-aggressive manner in the international system (Clark 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Fordham 2005; Smith 1996). This is a question that should be further explored in future work.

In thinking about the relationship between authoritarian institutions and threat management, additional research may also want to disaggregate nonmilitary regimes. In particular, there may be some utility from thinking about the forms of domestic conflict and the level of intensity generated under different institutional configurations. Along these lines, it may also be worthwhile to more extensively separate domestic threats stemming from coup attempts from mass-based domestic conflicts and to consider how the cohesiveness of the military affects its ability to both govern and fight. Of note for future research on this topic, however, is the observation that the same explanations for why military dictatorships are more likely to fight internal and external conflicts also help to explain why they are unlikely to fight multiple conflicts at the same time.

## Conclusion

While other scholars have related institutional differences in authoritarian regimes to the probability of experiencing domestic and international conflict, this study considers the interconnectedness of the two processes. Specifically, we argue that the lack of institutional constraints and the strength of their armed forces makes military regimes more likely to become involved in either type of conflict. Nevertheless, the lack of alternatives to coercion as governance techniques and the concern for spreading the security apparatus too thinly prohibit military autocracies from engaging in international conflict when domestic conflict is on the horizon.

The literature has been generally correct in portraying military dictatorships as more belligerent, both domestically and internationally, but has

neglected to consider the institutional capacity of military dictatorships to be involved simultaneously in both types of conflict. Understanding the unique challenges posed in different institutional settings therefore helps to add nuance to a variety of conflict behaviors in authoritarian regimes. If military regimes are indeed less able to effectively fight simultaneous conflicts, and if foreign policy failures can decrease leader survivability, this article may provide support for previous findings on why military dictatorships are so easily undermined and on their fragility (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2005; Geddes 2003; Remmer 1991). Future work in support of better understanding the relationship between regime type and international conflict activity should therefore consider the conditional impact that domestic instability has on government capacity to engage in conflict. Further exploring the impacts of political institutions and domestic conditions also promises to yield new insights into international interactions, the duration of modern authoritarianism, and different forms of political transitions.

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


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
## Appendix

**Table A1.** Summary Statistics.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Military Regime	0.13	0.33	0	1	4591
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.48	0.26	0	1	10072
External Conflict	0.50	0.22	0	1	7887
External Peace Years	17.53	14.78	0	58	7887
Internal Conflict	0.13	0.33	0	1	7887
Internal Peace Years	15.99	15.02	0	58	7887
GDP, logged	7.55	1.37	3.64	10.90	8264
Population, logged	8.45	2.11	1.73	14.06	8584
L.America	0.10	0.30	0	1	12963
N.Africa & M.East	0.11	0.31	0	1	12963
S.S.Africa	0.25	0.43	0	1	12963
E.Asia	0.03	0.17	0	1	12963
S.E.Asia	0.06	0.24	0	1	12963
S.Asia	0.05	0.21	0	1	12963



**Figure A1.** Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. (Models include the lagged dependent variable and a count of peace years).



**Figure A2.** Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. (Models include the lagged dependent variable and a count of peace years).

**Table A2.** Logistic Regression Predicting External Conflict, Using Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010).

Variable	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.
Military Regime $t_{-1}$	1.18	(0.20)
Internal Conflict $t_{-1}$	1.19	(0.35)***
Military Regime x Internal Conflict $t_{-1}$	0.51	(0.22)
External Conflict $t_{-1}$	31.76	(4.42)***
External Peace Years $t_{-1}$	0.94	(0.01)***
Intercept	0.05	(0.01)***
<i>N</i>	7,630	
log-likelihood	-992	

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$  \*\* $p < 0.05$  \* $p < 0.10$ .

**Table A3.** Logistic Regression Predicting Internal Conflict.

Variable	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.
Military Regime $t_{-1}$	1.71	(0.32)***
External Conflict $t_{-1}$	1.46	(0.44)
Military Regime x External Conflict $t_{-1}$	0.60	(0.40)
Internal Conflict $t_{-1}$	72.89	(10.85)***
Internal Peace Years $t_{-1}$	0.96	(0.01)***
Intercept	0.06	(0.01)***
<i>N</i>	4,161	
log-likelihood	-813	

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$  \*\* $p < 0.05$  \* $p < 0.10$ .

**Table A4.** Conflict Involvement for Personalist Regimes: Logit Estimates.

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2
Personalist regime $t_{-1}$	-0.64** (0.28)	0.04 (0.16)
Internal $t_{-1}$	0.30 (0.26)	4.33*** (0.15)
External $t_{-1}$	3.53*** (0.18)	-0.01 (0.32)
Personalist x Internal $t_{-1}$	0.61 (0.50)	
Time since last external $t_{-1}$	-0.06*** (0.01)	
Personalist x External $t_{-1}$		1.32** (0.64)
Time since last internal $t_{-1}$		-0.04*** (0.01)
Constant	-2.90*** (0.15)	-2.81*** (0.13)
Observations	4,161	4,161
Log-likelihood	-570.83	-814.61

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

**Table A5.** Conflict Involvement, Controlling for Coups: Logit Estimates.

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2
Military regime $t_{-1}$ <i>including military-personal and indirect military</i>	0.58** (0.23)	0.66*** (0.23)
External $t_{-1}$	3.57*** (0.19)	3.57*** (0.19)
Time since last external $t_{-1}$	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Attempted coup $t_{-1}$	-0.17 (0.62)	
Military x Attempted coup $t_{-1}$	1.10 (0.84)	
Successful coup $t_{-1}$		-0.57 (0.70)
Military x Successful coup $t_{-1}$		0.69 (0.99)
Constant	-3.04*** (0.16)	-3.03*** (0.16)
Observations	4,003	4,003
Log-likelihood	-529.79	-530.65

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

\* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$ .