

**Professor:** Matthew Wilson  
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**Office:** 315D Woodburn Hall

**Room:** 306E Woodburn Hall  
**Dates:** 08/18 - 12/08  
**Time:** T 2:30-5:15 PM

### COURSE DESCRIPTION:

The core seminar on comparative politics provides an introduction to the dominant questions, theories, and empirical research in comparative politics. Comparative politics concerns itself with the study of political phenomena that occur predominantly *within* countries, comprising a vast set of research agendas. The substantive topics covered in this course include, among other things, varieties of democracy and dictatorship, civil conflict and regime change, the politics of culture and identity, accountability and representation, comparative political economy, and statebuilding processes. The course has two primary goals: (i) to prepare students for a research career in comparative politics by providing a general survey of the field and highlighting issues related to conceptualization and measurement, and (ii) to help prepare doctoral candidates for the comprehensive examination in comparative politics.

### COURSE REQUIREMENTS:

1. *Participation* (10%)

Each student is expected to attend each seminar, read the assigned material before each class, and be prepared to discuss assigned material. Grades will be based on knowledge of the material, and on the quality and the frequency of participation.

2. *Discussion Leadership* (40%)

Each student will be assigned a seminar to lead. As discussion leader, the student must: (i) prepare a list of questions to facilitate class discussion; (ii) submit notes for each of the readings to <http://goo.gl/forms/P2PQGxKwYi>; and (iii) give a presentation on the readings to the rest of the class (not to exceed 30 minutes). In the presentation, the discussant should address the following questions on the readings:

- What is the main question? What is the motivation behind the question?
- What are the theoretical assumptions? Are the concepts in the theory clearly defined? Are the key actors in the theory individuals, groups, states, or organizations?
- Are the theoretical assumptions accurate? Are there circumstances under which they might not be true?
- What are the observable implications of the theory? (If the theory is true, what should we observe?)
- Which implications does the researcher test? Does the research design strategy adequately test the theory?
- What is the unit of analysis? How are cases selected and what is the sample? Is the research design qualitative or quantitative, or both?
- Are the theoretical concepts validly measured? How could they be improved upon?
- How does the research address alternative explanations with the research design? Are there other potential alternative explanations?

The depth of preparation evidenced in the questions and recorded notes, along with the student's presentation of the material, will determine their grade.

### 3. *Written Critique* (25%)

Each student is expected to write a 10-15 page (double-spaced) critique covering the readings from a week of the student's choice. Cumulatively, the student should contrast their theoretical contributions (assumptions, causal mechanisms, and empirical implications), differences in concept formation and measurement, the validity of their research designs (case selection, alternate explanations), and possible extensions based on their *combined contributions* (next steps and amendments to the theory).

### 4. *Research Design Paper* (25%)

Each student is expected to write a 10-15 page (double-spaced) research design on a topic of the student's choice. The student should explain the importance of the topic and a succinct synthesis of existing research on the issue. After outlining a theory and hypotheses (as well as competing theories), the student should indicate the type of data they propose to use: what is the unit of analysis? Will the project rely on existing data or must data be collected? What sources are available? What are the criteria for choosing cases? What are the strengths and limitations of the proposed sources/data? The research design may call for large-N analysis or case studies, both of which are appropriate. The paper should summarize the data (if available) and describe the anticipated results.

## **FINE PRINT:**

Academic Integrity. The integrity of the classes offered by any academic institution solidifies the foundation of its mission and cannot be sacrificed to expediency, ignorance, or blatant fraud. Therefore, I will enforce rigorous standards of academic integrity in all aspects and assignments of this course. For the detailed policy of West Virginia University regarding the definitions of acts considered to fall under academic dishonesty and possible ensuing sanctions, please see the West Virginia University Academic Catalog at <http://catalog.wvu.edu/undergraduate/coursecreditstermsclassification/#academicintegritytext>. Should you have any questions about possibly improper research citations or references, or any other activity that may be interpreted as an attempt at academic dishonesty, please see me before the assignment is due to discuss the matter.

Adverse Weather Commitment. In the event of inclement or threatening weather, everyone should use his or her best judgment regarding travel to and from campus. Safety should be the main concern. If you cannot get to class because of adverse weather conditions, you should contact me as soon as possible. Similarly, if I am unable to reach our class location, I will notify you of any cancellation or change as soon as possible (at least one hour before class starts), using MIX to prevent you from embarking on any unnecessary travel. If you cannot get to class because of weather conditions, I will make allowances relative to required attendance policies, as well as any scheduled tests, quizzes, or other assessments.

Inclusivity. The West Virginia University community is committed to creating and fostering a positive learning and working environment based on open communication, mutual respect, and inclusion. If you are a person with a disability and anticipate needing any type of accommodation in order to participate in this class, please advise me and make appropriate arrangements with the Office of Accessibility Services (293-6700). For more information on West Virginia University's Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion initiatives, please see <http://diversity.wvu.edu>.

Sexual Misconduct and Resources. West Virginia University (WVU) does not tolerate sexual misconduct, including harassment, stalking, sexual assault, sexual exploitation, or relationship violence [BOG Policy 44]. It is important for you to know that there are resources available if you or someone you know needs assistance. You may speak to a member of university administration, faculty, or staff, but keep in mind that they have an obligation to report the incident to the Title IX Coordinator. If you want to speak to someone who is permitted to keep your disclosure confidential, please seek assistance from the Carruth Center, 304-293-9355 or 304-293-4431 (24-hour hotline), and locally within the community at the Rape and Domestic Violence Information Center (RDVIC), 304-292-5100 or 304-292-4431 (24-hour hotline).

Students are responsible for knowing both university and course schedules.

The academic calendar is available at: [http://provost.wvu.edu/academic\\_calendar](http://provost.wvu.edu/academic_calendar).

### CLASS SCHEDULE († *Required readings*):

- Note: The course closely follows the outline of the following *recommended* textbook:

Clark, W. R., Golder, M., and Golder, S. N. (2013). *Principles of Comparative Politics*. London: Sage Publishers.

- The following books are also required reading and are therefore recommended for purchase:

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., and Morrow, J. D. (2005). *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press, (paperback) edition.

Dahl, R. A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Tilly, C. (1992). *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell.

- For advice on reading scholarly materials, see: <http://goo.gl/pnjf6z>

08/18 ***Introduction & Course outline***

08/25 ***What is Science? What is Politics?***

Collier, D. and Jr., J. E. M. (1993). Conceptual “stretching” revisited: Adapting categories in comparative analysis. *American Political Science Review*, 87(4):845–855†

Collier, D., Brady, H. E., and Seawright, J. (2010). Outdated views of qualitative methods: Time to move on. *Political Analysis*, 18(4):506–513†

Collier, D., LaPorte, J., and Seawright, J. (2012). Putting typologies to work: Concept formation, measurement, and analytic rigor. *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(1):217–232†

Lemke, D. (2003). African lessons for international relations research. *World Politics*, 56(1):114–138†

Seawright, J. and Gerring, J. (2008). Case selection techniques in case study research: A menu of qualitative and quantitative options. *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(2):294–308†

Sekhon, J. S. (2004). Quality meets quantity: Case studies, conditional probability, and counterfactuals. *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(2):281–293†

Braumoeller, B. F. and Goertz, G. (2000). The methodology of necessary conditions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(4):844–858.

Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process tracing. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 44(4):823–830.

Laitin, D. D. (2003). The perestroikan challenge to social science. *Politics & Society*, 31(1):163–184.

Seawright, J. (2005). Qualitative comparative analysis vis-à-vis regression. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 40(1):3–26.

Wood, E. J. (2008). Field research. In Bois, C. and (Eds.), S. S., editors, *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

09/01 ***The Origins of the Modern State***

- Chanaiwa, D. S. (1980). The zulu revolution: State formation in a pastoralist society. *African Studies Review*, 23(3):1–20<sup>†</sup>
- North, Douglass, C. and Thomas, R. P. (1971). The rise and fall of the manorial system: A theoretical model. *Journal of Economic History*, 31(4):777–803<sup>†</sup>
- Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. *American Political Science Review*, 87(3):567–576<sup>†</sup>
- Tilly, C. (1992). *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell<sup>†</sup>
- Weingast, B. R. (1997). The political foundations of democracy and the rule of law. *American Political Science Review*, 91(2):245–263<sup>†</sup>

09/08 ***Conceptualizing and Measuring Politics***

- Collier, D. and Adcock, R. (1999). Democracy and dichotomies: A pragmatic approach to choices about concepts. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2:537–565<sup>†</sup>
- Dahl, R. A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press<sup>†</sup>
- Munck, G. L. and Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy : Evaluating alternative indices. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(1):5–34<sup>†</sup>
- Schmitter, P. C. and Karl, T. L. (1991). What democracy is... and is not. *Journal of Democracy*, 2(3):67–73<sup>†</sup>
- Seawright, J. and Collier, D. (2014). Rival strategies of validation: Tools for evaluating measures of democracy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(1):111–138<sup>†</sup>
- Collier, D. and Levitsky, S. (1997). Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual innovation in comparative research. *World Politics*, 49(3):430–451.
- Elkins, Z. (2000). Gradations of democracy? empirical tests of alternative conceptualizations. *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(2):293–300.
- Pemstein, D., Meserve, S. A., and Melton, J. (2010). Democratic compromise: A latent variable analysis of ten measures of regime type. *Political Analysis*, 18(4):426–449.

09/15 ***The Economic Determinants of Politics***

- Andersen, J. J. and Ross, M. L. (2014). The big oil change: A closer look at the haber-menaldo analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(7):993–1021<sup>†</sup>
- Barro, R. J. (1999). Determinants of democracy. *Journal of Political Economy*, 107:158–183<sup>†</sup>
- Bates, R. H. and Lien, D.-H. D. (1985). A note on taxation, development, and representative government. *Politics & Society*, 14(1):53–70<sup>†</sup>
- Cusack, T. R., Iverson, T., and Soskice, D. (2007). Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. *American Political Science Review*, 101(3):373–391<sup>†</sup>
- Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1997). Modernization: Theories and facts. *World Politics*, 49:155–183<sup>†</sup>
- Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic development and democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9:503–527<sup>†</sup>
- Moore, B. (1966). *Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Beacon Press, Boston.
- Ross, M. (2001). Does oil hinder democracy? *World Politics*, 53:325–361.

09/22 ***The Cultural Determinants of Politics***

- Bednar, J. and Page, S. E. (2007). Can game(s) theory explain culture? the emergence of cultural behavior within multiple games. *Rationality and Society*, 19(1):65–97<sup>†</sup>

- Greif, A. (1994). Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies. *Journal of Political Economy*, 102:912–950<sup>†</sup>
- Inglehart, R. and Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review*, 65:19–51<sup>†</sup>
- Jackman, R. W. and Miller, R. A. (1996). A renaissance of political culture? *American Journal of Political Science*, 40(3):632–659<sup>†</sup>
- Kalyvas, S. N. (2000). Commitment problems in emerging democracies: The case of religious parties. *Comparative Politics*, 32(4):379–398<sup>†</sup>
- Muller, E. N., Mitchell, and Seligson (1994). Civic culture and democracy: The question of causal relationships. *American Political Science Review*, 88(3):635–652<sup>†</sup>
- Axelrod, R. (1984). *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Levi, M. and Stoker, L. (2000). Political trust and trustworthiness. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3:475–507.
- Uslaner, E. (2002). *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Varshney, A. (2002). *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

### 09/29 **Varieties of Dictatorship**

- Brownlee, J. (2007). Hereditary succession in modern autocracies. *World Politics*, 59(4):595–628<sup>†</sup>
- Gandhi, J. and Przeworski, A. (2007). Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(11):1279–1301<sup>†</sup>
- Geddes, B., Frantz, E., and Wright, J. G. (2014a). Military rule. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17:147–162<sup>†</sup>
- Svolik, M. W. (2009). Power sharing and leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2):477–494<sup>†</sup>
- Wilson, M. C. (2013). A discreet critique of discrete regime type data. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(5):689–714<sup>†</sup>
- Wright, J. (2008). Do authoritarian institutions constrain? how legislatures affect economic growth and investment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(2):322–343<sup>†</sup>
- Geddes, B. (2003). *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Miller, M. K. (2015). Elections, information, and policy responsiveness in autocratic regimes. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(6):691–727.
- Svolik, M. W. (2012b). *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

### 10/06 **Varieties of Democracy**

- Bassi, A. (2013). A model of endogenous government formation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4):777–793<sup>†</sup>
- Cheibub, J. A., Przeworski, A., and Saiegh, S. M. (2004). Government coalitions and legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 34:565–587<sup>†</sup>
- Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z., and Ginsburg, T. (2014). Beyond presidentialism and parliamentarism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(3):515–544<sup>†</sup>
- Hellwig, T. and Samuels, D. (2007). Electoral accountability and the variety of democratic regimes. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38:65–90<sup>†</sup>
- Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press<sup>†</sup>
- Mainwaring, S. and Shugart, M. S. (1997). Juan linz, presidentialism, and democracy: A critical appraisal. *Comparative Politics*, 29(4):449–471.

10/13 [No class]

10/20 ***Problems with Group Decision Making***

Brams, S. J. and Fishburn, P. C. (2002). Voting procedures. In Kenneth Arrow, A. S. and (Eds.), K. S., editors, *Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare*, pages 173–236. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science<sup>†</sup>

Campbell, D. E. and Kelly, J. S. (2002). Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework. In Kenneth Arrow, A. S. and (Eds.), K. S., editors, *Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare*, pages 35–94. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science<sup>†</sup>

Casper, B. A. and Tyson, S. A. (2014). Popular protest and elite coordination in a coup d'état. *Journal of Politics*, 76(2):548–564<sup>†</sup>

Tucker, J. A. (2007). Enough! electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3):535–551<sup>†</sup>

Young, P. (1995). Optimal voting rules. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 9(1):51–64<sup>†</sup>

Andrews, J. (2002). *When Majorities Fail*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

10/27 ***Democratic Transitions***

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006). *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, New York<sup>†</sup>

Carothers, T. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1):5–21<sup>†</sup>

Hellman, J. S. (1998). Winners take all: The politics of partial reform in postcommunist transitions. *World Politics*, 50(2):203–234<sup>†</sup>

McFaul, M. (2002). The fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship: Noncooperative transitions in the postcommunist world. *World Politics*, 54(2):212–244<sup>†</sup>

Strand, H., Hegre, H., Gates, S., and Dahl, M. (2012). Democratic waves? global patterns of democratization, 1816-2008. 3rd International Conference on Democracy as Idea and Practice, Oslo, 12-13 January<sup>†</sup>

Epstein, D., Bates, R., Goldstone, J., Kristensen, I., and O'Halloran, S. (2006). Democratic transitions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50:551–569.

Geddes, B. (1999). What do we know about democratization after twenty years? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2:115–144.

Munck, G. L. and Leff, C. S. (1997). Modes of transition and democratization: South america and eastern europe in comparative perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 29(3):343–362.

11/03 ***Elections and Electoral Systems***

Benoit, K. (2000). Which electoral formula is the most proportional? a new look with new evidence. *Political Analysis*, 8(4):381–388<sup>†</sup>

Boix, C. (1999). Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 93(3):609–624<sup>†</sup>

Brambor, T., Clark, W. R., and Golder, M. (2007). Are african party systems different? *Electoral Studies*, 26:315–323<sup>†</sup>

Calvo, E. (2009). The competitive road to proportional representation: Partisan biases and electoral regime change under increasing party competition. *World Politics*, 61(2):254–295<sup>†</sup>

Calvo, E. and Hellwig, T. (2011). Centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(1):27–41<sup>†</sup>

Carey, J. M. and Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: a rank ordering of electoral formulas. *Electoral Studies*, 14(4):417–439<sup>†</sup>

Bormann, N.-C. and Golder, M. (2013). Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946-2011. *Electoral Studies*, 32:360–369.

11/10 ***Social Cleavages and Party Systems***

- Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., and Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? *American Political Science Review*, 101(4):709–725<sup>†</sup>
- Londregan, J., Bienen, H., and van de Walle, N. (1995). Ethnicity and leadership succession in africa. *International Studies Quarterly*, 39(1):1–25<sup>†</sup>
- Neto, O. A. and Cox, G. W. (1997). Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(1):149–174<sup>†</sup>
- Posner, D. N. (2004). The political salience of cultural difference: Why chewas and tumbukas are allies in zambia and adversaries in malawi. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4):529–545<sup>†</sup>
- Selway, J. and Templeman, K. (2012). The myth of consociationalism? conflict reduction in divided societies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(12):1542–1571<sup>†</sup>
- Tavits, M. and Letki, N. (2014). From values to interests? the evolution of party competition in new democracies. *Journal of Politics*, 76(1):246–258<sup>†</sup>

11/17 ***Institutional Veto Players***

- Carrubba, C. J. (2009). A model of the endogenous development of judicial institutions in federal and international systems. *Journal of Politics*, 71(1):55–69<sup>†</sup>
- Herron, E. S. and Boyko, N. (2015). Horizontal accountability during political transition: The use of deputy requests in ukraine, 2002–2006. *Party Politics*, 21(1):131–142<sup>†</sup>
- Svolik, M. (2012a). Contracting on violence: The moral hazard in authoritarian repression and military intervention in politics. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57(5):765–794<sup>†</sup>
- Truex, R. (2014). The returns to office in a “rubber stamp” parliament. *American Political Science Review*, 108(2):235–251<sup>†</sup>
- Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(3):289–325<sup>†</sup>
- Vigour, C. (2014). Veto players and interest groups in lawmaking: A comparative analysis of judicial reforms in italy, belgium, and france. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(4):1891–1918<sup>†</sup>
- Carey, J. M. (2007). Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1):92–107.
- Duch, R., Przepiorka, W., and Stevenson, R. (2015). Responsibility attribution for collective decision makers. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(2):372–389.
- Helmke, G. (2002). The logic of strategic defection: Court-executive relations in argentina under dictatorship and democracy. *American Political Science Review*, 96:305–320.

11/24 **[No class]**12/01 ***Political Outcomes I***

- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., and Morrow, J. D. (2005). *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press, (paperback) edition<sup>†</sup>
- Iverson, T. and Soskice, D. (2006). Electoral institutions that the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. *American Political Science Review*, 100(2):165–181<sup>†</sup>
- Jones, B. F. and Olken, B. A. (2005). Do leaders matter? national leadership and growth since world war ii. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3):835–864<sup>†</sup>
- Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1993). Political regimes and economic growth. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 7(3):51–69<sup>†</sup>
- Ross, M. (2006). Is democracy good for the poor? *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4):860–874<sup>†</sup>

Baum, M. A. and Lake, D. A. (2003). The political economy of growth: Democracy and human capital. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(2):333–347.

Gerring, J., Thacker, S. C., and Alfaro, R. (2012). Democracy and human development. *Journal of Politics*, 74(1):1–17.

## 12/08 *Political Outcomes II & Conclusion*

Cheibub, J. A. (1998). Political regimes and the extractive capacity of governments: Taxation in democracies and dictatorships. *World Politics*, 50(3):349–376<sup>†</sup>

Epperly, B. (2011). Institutions and legacies: Electoral volatility in the postcommunist world. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(7):829–853<sup>†</sup>

Gervasoni, C. (2010). A rentier theory of subnational regimes: Fiscal federalism, democracy, and authoritarianism in the argentine provinces. *World Politics*, 62(2):302–340<sup>†</sup>

Hafner-Burton, E. M., Hyde, S. D., and Jablonski, R. S. (2013). When do governments resort to election violence? *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(1):149–179<sup>†</sup>

King, G., Pan, J., and Roberts, M. E. (2013). How censorship in china allows government criticism but silences collective expression. *American Political Science Review*, 107(2):2<sup>†</sup>

Kriekhaus, J. (2006). Democracy and economic growth: How regional context influences regime effects. *British Journal of Political Science*, 36(2):317–340<sup>†</sup>

Blaydes, L. (2006). Electoral budget cycles under authoritarianism: Economic opportunities in mubarak's egypt.

Roberts, T. L. (2015). The durability of presidential and parliament-based dictatorships. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(7):915–948.

Sørli, M. E., Gleditsch, N. P., and Strand, H. (2005). Why is there so much conflict in the middle east? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(1):141–165.



**ADDITIONAL (RECOMMENDED) READINGS*****What is Science? What is Politics?***

- Abadie, A., Diamond, A., and Hainmueller, J. (2015). Comparative politics and the synthetic control method. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(2):495–510.
- Adcock, R. and Collier, D. (2001). Measurement validity: A shared standard for qualitative and quantitative research. *American Political Science Review*, 95(3):529–546.
- Beck, N. (2006). Is causal-process observation an oxymoron? *Political Analysis*, 14(3):347–352.
- Beck, N. (2010). Causal process “observation”: Oxymoron or (fine) old wine. *Political Analysis*, 18(4):499–505.
- Bennett, A. and Elman, C. (2007). Qualitative methods: The view from the subfields. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(2):111–121.
- Brady, H. E., Collier, D., and Seawright, J. (2006). Toward a pluralistic vision of methodology. *Political Analysis*, 14(3):353–368.
- Braumoeller, B. F. (2003). Causal complexity and the study of politics. *Political Analysis*, 11(3):209–233.
- Collier, D. (1993). The comparative method. In (Ed.), A. W. F., editor, *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II*. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
- Collier, D. and Mahoney, J. (1996). Insights and pitfalls: Selection bias in qualitative research. *World Politics*, 49(1):56–91.
- Coppedge, M. (1999). Thickening thin concepts and theories: Combining large n and small in comparative politics. *Comparative Politics*, 31(4):465–476.
- Dion, D. (1998). Evidence and inference in the comparative case study. *Comparative Politics*, 30(2):127–145.
- Fearon, J. D. (1991). Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. *World Politics*, 43(2):169–195.
- Gerring, J. (2007). Is there a (viable) crucial-case method? *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(3):231–253.
- Gerring, J. (2010). Causal mechanisms: Yes, but... *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(11):1499–1526.
- Hug, S. (2013). Qualitative comparative analysis: How inductive use and measurement error lead to problematic inference. *Political Analysis*, 21:252–265.
- King, G. and Zeng, L. (2007). When can history be our guide? the pitfalls of counterfactual inference. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51:183–210.
- Lieberman, E. S. (2005). Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative research. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3):435–452.
- Lieberson, S. (1991). Small n’s and big conclusions: An examination of the reasoning in comparative studies based on a small number of cases. *Social Forces*, 70(2):307–320.
- Lieberson, S. (1994). More on the uneasy case for using mill-type methods in small-n comparative studies. *Social Forces*, 72(4):1225–1237.
- Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative politics and the comparative method. *American Political Science Review*, 65(3):682–693.
- Lijphart, A. (1975). The comparable-cases strategy in comparative research. *Comparative Political Studies*, 8(2):158–177.
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